"trivial" changes to DNS (was: OpenNTPProject.org)

Christopher Morrow morrowc.lists at gmail.com
Thu Jan 16 16:48:56 UTC 2014

On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:39 AM, Andrew Sullivan <asullivan at dyn.com> wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 16, 2014 at 11:32:05AM -0500, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>> pretty easy to believe that quic would be helpful right?
> Yes.  It's also pretty easy to believe that ditching DNS completely in
> favour of something without 8 billion warts would be helpful.
>> seems totally feasible.
> Certainly, it would be possible to standardize it.  Whether it would
> be "trivial" to get it deployed is quite a different matter.  The
> evidence to date is that there is a very, very long tail in any change
> having to do with the DNS.  We are still, to this day, fighting with
> sysadmins who are convinced that firewall rules on TCP/53 are
> perfectly reasonable, even though DNS _always_ used TCP.
> People who believe there are going to be easy fixes to the issues
> coming from DNS are deluding themselves.

I totally agree... I was actually joking in my last note :( sorry for
not adding the ":)" as requisite in email.

So... what other options are there to solve the larger problem of:
  "Some service is running on a public host, and it can be used to
attack a third party"

where in all of these cases the third party is someone who's address
has been spoofed in the src-address of a packet.


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