"Everyone should be deploying BCP 38! Wait, they are ...."

Tue Feb 18 21:52:04 UTC 2014

I agree that Barry's post can be read in misleading ways and I seem to
recall chatting about that with him at some point.

As to one poster's comment about random sampling, I'm pretty sure the
Spoofer project likely fell short in a number of ways (e.g. being
documented in not every language).

So, if NATs prevent (many? most?) end-user machines for being able inject
spoofed IPv4 source addresses (IPv6 home gateways may well not provide such
protection), maybe we should conclude that most of the spoofing is coming
from somewhere else; perhaps including colo and cloud providers.

I wonder how many users/admins of those kinds of machines ran the Spoofer
test SW.

Tony

On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 2:22 PM, Jared Mauch <jared at puck.nether.net> wrote:

>
> On Feb 18, 2014, at 1:40 PM, Patrick W. Gilmore <patrick at ianai.net> wrote:
>
> > Barry is a well respected security researcher. I'm surprised he posted
> this.
> >
> > In his defense, he did it over a year ago (June 11, 2012). Maybe we
> should ask him about it. I'll do that now....
>
> I'm not surprised in any regard.  There are too many names for BCP-38,
> SAV, SSAC-004, BCP-84, Ingress Filtering, etc..
>
> There are many networks that perform this best practice either by
> "default" through NAT/firewalls or by explicit configuration of the devices.
>
> There are many networks that one will never be able to measure nor audit
> as well, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't continue to work on tracking
> back spoofed packets and reporting the attacks, and securing devices.
>
> - Jared
>
>
>