TWC (AS11351) blocking all NTP?
peter.phaal at gmail.com
Tue Feb 4 00:54:40 UTC 2014
On Mon, Feb 3, 2014 at 2:58 PM, Christopher Morrow
<morrowc.lists at gmail.com> wrote:
> wait, so the whole of the thread is about stopping participants in the
> attack, and you're suggesting that removing/changing end-system
> switch/routing gear and doing something more complex than:
> deny udp any 123 any
> deny udp any 123 any 123
> permit ip any any
> is a good plan?
> I'd direct you at:
> and particularly at:
> "Tutorial: ISP Security - Real World Techniques II"
Thanks for the links. Many SDN solutions can be replicated using
manual processes (or are ways of automating currently manual
processes). Programmatic APIs allows the speed and accuracy of the
response to be increased and the solution to be delivered at scale and
at lower cost.
> it's probably not a good plan to forklift your edge, for dos targets
> where all you really need is a 3 line acl.
For many networks it doesn't need to be forklift upgrade - vendors are
adding programmatic APIs to their existing products (OpenFlow, Arista
eAPI, NETCONF, ALU Web Services ...) - so a firmware upgrade may be
all that is required.
I do think that there are operational advantages to using protocols
like OpenFlow, I2RS, BGP FlowSpec for these soft controls since they
allow the configuration to remain relatively static and they avoid
problems of split control (for example, and operator makes a config
change and saves, locking in a temporary control from the SDN system).
I would argue that the more specific the ACL can be the less
collateral damage. Built-in measurement allows for a more targeted
>> Good point - the proposed solution is most effective for protecting
>> customers that are targeted by DDoS attacks. While trying to prevent
> Oh, so the 3 line acl is not an option? or (for a lot of customers a
> fine answer) null route? Some things have changed in the world of dos
> mitigation, but a bunch of the basics still apply. I do know that in
> the unfortunate event that your network is the transit or terminus of
> a dos attack at high volume you want to do the least configuration
> that'll satisfy the 2 parties involved (you and your customer)...
> doing a bunch of hardware replacement and/or sdn things when you can
> get the job done with some acls or routing changes is really going to
> be risky.
I think an automatic system using a programmatic API to install as
narrowly scoped a filter as possible is the most conservative and
least risky option. Manual processes are error prone, slow, and blunt
instruments like a null route can cause collateral damage to services.
>>>> Typical networks probably only see a few DDoS attacks an hour at the
>>>> most, so pushing a few rules an hour to mitigate them should have
>>>> little impact on the switch control plane.
>>> based on what math did you get 'few per hour?' As an endpoint (focal
>>> point) or as a contributor? The problem that started this discussion
>>> was being a contributor...which I bet happens a lot more often than
>>> /few an hour/.
>> I am sorry, I should have been clearer, the SDN solution I was
>> describing is aimed at protecting the target's links, rather than
>> mitigating the botnet and amplification layers.
> and i'd say that today sdn is out of reach for most deployments, and
> that the simplest answer is already available.
>> The number of attacks was from the perspective of DDoS targets and
>> their service providers. If you are considering each participant in
>> the attack the number goes up considerably.
> I bet roland has some good round-numbers on number of dos attacks per
> day... I bet it's higher than a few per hour globally, for the ones
> that get noticed.
The "few per hour" number isn't a global statistic. This is the number
that a large hosting data center might experience. The global number
is much larger, but not very relevant to a specific provider looking
to size a mitigation solution.
> note that the focus of the original thread was on the contributors. I
> think the target part of the problem has been solved since before the
> slides in the pdf link at the top...
Do most service providers allow their customers to control ACLs in the
upstream routers? Do they automatically monitor traffic and insert the
filters themselves when there is an attack? I don't believe so - while
the slides describe a solution, automation is needed to make available
at large scale.
> you're getting pretty complicated for the target side:
> ip access-list 150 permit ip any any log
> (note this is basically taken verbatim from the slides)
> view logs, see the overwhelming majority are to hostX port Y proto
> Z... filter, done.
> you can do that in about 5 mins time, quicker if you care to rush a bit.
An automated system can perform the analysis and apply the filter in a
second with no human intervention. What if you have to manage
thousands of customer links?
>> This brings up an interesting point use case for an OpenFlow capable
>> switch - replicating sFlow, NetFlow, IPFIX, Syslog, SNMP traps etc.
>> Many top of rack switches can also forward the traffic through a
>> GRE/VxLAN tunnel as well.
> yes, more complexity seems like a great plan... in the words of
> someone else: "I encourage my competitors to do this"
Using the existing switches to replicate and tap production traffic is
less complex and more scalable than alternatives. You may find the
following use case interesting:
> I think roland's other point that not very many people actually even
> use sflow is not to be taken lightly here either.
It doesn't have to be sFlow - the sFlow solution was provided as a
concrete example since that is the technology I am most familiar with.
However, sFlow, IPFIX, NetFlow, jFlow etc. combined with analytics and
a programmatic control API allows DDoS mitigation to be automated. I
think Roland would agree that an automated response is more effective
than a manual process.
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