CfP - Survey on Internet Routing Security

Abt, Sebastian sebastian.abt at
Mon Dec 22 21:43:22 UTC 2014


Right to the year’s end I’d like to share the CfP below with you and ask for your participation.  The aim of this survey is to better understand what the operational community thinks about the state of Internet routing security (read: BGP security), associated risks and tentative solutions (IRR-based prefix filtering, RPKI origin validation).

I regard the outcome as highly interesting and am looking forward to it.  I would also appreciate you sharing the CfP via any relevant channel if you think it’s worth it.  Every vote counts in order to be able to capture a complete view of the community’s mindset.

Thanks and all the best,

+----------------------- Call for Participation -----------------------+
|                  Survey on Internet Routing Security                 |
|                   opened from 15.12.14 - 09.01.15                    |
+----------------> <-----------------+

Prefix hijacking is a well-known problem of Internet routing.  As of 
today, a technique typically deployed to counter prefix hijacking is 
strict IRR-based peer filtering.  However, strict filtering may be 
challenging for various reasons and, hence, is unfortunately not 
entirely applied.

To improve Internet routing security and to overcome challenges of 
strict IRR-based peer filtering, RPKI has been proposed.  Currently,
RPKI origin validation is supported by most RIRs and modern router 
operating systems.  However, recent statistics show that only a limited
number of ASes actually deploy RPKI in any form.

With this survey, we aim at identifying issues and problems with IRR-
based filtering and RPKI from the operational community's point of
view and try to quantify the number of ASes actively participating in
RPKI.  Your input is highly appreciated!  Participating in the survey 
should not take longer than 10 minutes and is completely anonymous.

Aggregated results of this survey will be published on the da/sec -
Biometrics and Internet Security Research Group’s website [1].

If you have any questions in advance, please do not hesitate to get
in touch with Sebastian Abt <sebastian.abt at>

Thank you for your participation!



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