Requirements for IPv6 Firewalls

Lee Howard Lee at
Mon Apr 21 16:10:31 UTC 2014

On 4/18/14 10:16 PM, "Matt Palmer" <mpalmer at> wrote:

>On Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 10:04:35PM -0400, Jeff Kell wrote:
>> As to address the other argument in this threat on NAT / private
>> addressing, PCI requirement 1.3.8 pretty much requires RFC1918
>> of the computers in scope...  has anyone hinted at PCI for IPv6?
>1.3.8 lists use of RFC1918 address space as one of four possible
>implementations, immediately after the phrase "may include, but are not
>limited to".  I don't interpret that as "pretty much requires RFC1918".

It's not clear whether those are alternatives or should all be employed.
An auditor will tend to recommend all of them.

>Now, if you'd like to claim that 1.3.8 is completely useless, I won't
>with you -- it's security-by-obscurity of the worst possible form.  But
>don't blame PCI compliance for any inability to deploy IPv6, because it
>ain't true.

"Methods used to meet the intent of this
requirement may vary depending on the specific
networking technology being used. For example,
the controls used to meet this requirement may be
different for IPv4 networks than for IPv6 networks."

Based on my experience with compliance auditors, they won't understand
many of the words in this sentence, and will assume NAT and RFC1918.  They
can often (but not always) be taught, but you have to take the time to
explain how IPv6 works, and how you prevent a reconnaissance attack. Many
enterprise network administrators are not up to this task, unfortunately.

ULA + NPT66 should be pretty easy to explain, both technically, and as a
method of demonstrating compliance.  However, preventing outbound route
leaks of more-specifics, and blocking inbound recon attacks/probes
*should* be equally compliant.


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