The US government has betrayed the Internet. We need to take it back

Fri Sep 6 19:14:32 UTC 2013

On Fri, Sep 06, 2013 at 12:03:56PM -0700, Michael Thomas wrote:
> On 09/06/2013 11:19 AM, Nicolai wrote:
> >That's true -- it is far easier to subvert email than most other
> >services, and in the case of email we probably need a wholly new
> >protocol.
> >
> 
> Uh, a first step might be to just turn on [START]TLS. We're not using the
> tools that have been implemented and deployed for a decade at least.

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-- doesn't do PFS, unfortunately. Everything should be doing PFS, now that we know.