BGP failure analysis and recommendations

Fri Oct 25 02:18:49 UTC 2013

On Oct 24, 2013, at 2:13 AM, nanog-request at nanog.org wrote:

> Message: 7
> Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 22:40:34 -0400
> From: JRC NOC <nospam-nanog at jensenresearch.com>
> To: nanog at nanog.org
> Subject: BGP failure analysis and recommendations
> Message-ID:
> 	<5.1.0.14.0.20131023214304.0396ead0 at authsmtp.jensenresearch.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
> 
> Hello Nanog -
> 
> On Saturday, October 19th at about 13:00 UTC we experienced an IP failure 
> at one of our sites in the New York area.
> It was apparently a widespread outage on the East coast, but I haven't seen 
> it discussed here.
> 
> We are multihomed, using EBGP to three (diverse) upstream providers. One 
> provider experienced a hardware failure in a core component at one POP.
> Regrettably, during the outage our BGP session remained active and we 
> continued receiving full routes from the affected AS.  And our prefixes 
> continued to be advertised at their border. However basically none of the 
> traffic between those prefixes over that provider was delivered. The bogus 
> routes stayed up for hours. We shutdown the BGP peering session when the 
> nature of the problem became clear. This was effective. I believe that all 
> customer BGP routes were similarly affected, including those belonging to 
> some large regional networks and corporations. I have raised the questions 
> below with the provider but haven't received any information or advice.
> 
> 

Did you provider provide an official written RFO yet?  

Courtney Smith
courtneysmith at comcast.net

()  ascii ribbon campaign - against html e-mail 
/\  www.asciiribbon.org   - against proprietary attachments