latest Snowden docs show NSA intercepts all Google and Yahoo DC-to-DC traffic
David Miller
dmiller at tiggee.com
Fri Nov 1 17:44:18 UTC 2013
On 11/01/2013 01:08 PM, Gary Buhrmaster wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 4:43 AM, Anthony Junk <anthonyrjunk at gmail.com> wrote:
> ...
>> It seems as if both Yahoo and Google assumed that since they were private
>> circuits that they didn't have to encrypt.
>
> I actually cannot see them assuming that. Google
> and Yahoo engineers are smart, and taping fibres
> has been well known for, well, "forever". I can
> see them making a business decision that the
> costs would be excessive to mitigate against
> taping(*) that would be allowed under the laws
> in any event.
>
> Gary
>
> (*) "A" mitigation was run the fibre through your
> own pressured pipe which you monitored for loss
> of pressure, so that even a "hot tap" on the pipe
> itself would possibly be detected (and there are
> countermeasures to countermeasures
> to countermeasures of the various methods).
> And even then, you had to have a someone walk
> the path from time to time to verify its integrity.
> And I am pretty sure there is even an NSA/DOD
> doc on the requirements/implementation to do
> those mitigations.
>
Given what we now know about the breadth of the NSA operations, and the
likelihood that this is still only the tip of the iceberg - would anyone
still point to NSA guidance on avoiding monitoring with any sort of
confidence?
There has always been cognitive dissonance in the dual roles of the NSA:
1. The NSA monitors.
2. The NSA provides guidance on how to avoid being monitored.
Conflict?
-DMM
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