Open Resolver Problems

Wed Mar 27 02:25:32 UTC 2013

On Tue, 26 Mar 2013, Matthew Petach wrote:

> The concern Valdis raised about securing recursives while still
> being able to issue static nameserver IPs to mobile devices
> is an orthogonal problem to Owen putting rate limiters on
> the authoritative servers for he.net.  If we're all lighting up
> pitchforks and raising torches, I'd kinda like to know at which
> castle we're going to go throw pitchforks.

BCP38.  As you can see from the wandering conversation, there are many 
attack vectors that hinge on the ability to spoof the source address, and 
thereby misdirect responses to your DDoS target.  BCP38 filtering stops 
them all.  Or, we can ignore BCP38 for several more years, go on a couple 
years crusade against open recursive resolvers, then against 
non-rate-limited authoratative servers, default public RO SNMP 
communities, etc.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
  Jon Lewis, MCP :)           |  I route
                              |  therefore you are
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