huawei
Scott Helms
khelms at zcorum.com
Sat Jun 15 12:10:29 UTC 2013
Jimmy,
This I agree with and in fact I said in earlier parts of this conversation
that the existence of a kill switch and/or backdoor in Huawei gear wouldn't
surprise me at all. Of course I'd say the same thing about pretty much all
the gear manufacturers and its really just a question of who has or can get
access to that information for a given manufacturer.
Scott Helms
Vice President of Technology
ZCorum
(678) 507-5000
--------------------------------
http://twitter.com/kscotthelms
--------------------------------
On Sat, Jun 15, 2013 at 7:57 AM, Jimmy Hess <mysidia at gmail.com> wrote:
> On 6/15/13, Scott Helms <khelms at zcorum.com> wrote:
> > They're terrible places for gathering non-targeted information because
> the
> > amount of data flowing through them means that that the likelihood of any
> > give packet having any value is very very low. If the goal includes
> [snip]
>
> The probability of a low-likelihood or infrequent event approaches
> 100%, given sufficient time, persistence, and creativity. Even if
> 1% or less of packets passing through are interesting; that happens
> to be more than enough to provide a snoop gains, and cause damage to
> a legitimate user.
>
> The potential existence of 'better' options; doesn't mean backdooring
> of routers wouldn't be included in part of a nation state or other bad
> actor's backdooring program.
>
> --
> -JH
>
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