SNMP DDoS: the vulnerability you might not know you have
james.braunegg at micron21.com
Wed Jul 31 15:39:06 UTC 2013
These attacks are known as SAD attacks ;( ... yes very SAD ;(
SNMP Amplification DDoS
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From: Blake Dunlap [mailto:ikiris at gmail.com]
Sent: Thursday, August 01, 2013 1:25 AM
To: Thomas St-Pierre
Cc: nanog at nanog.org
Subject: Re: SNMP DDoS: the vulnerability you might not know you have
Agreed, but progressively breaking every service on the internet at the
edge because you think there might possibly be an issue just leads to bad
Get better defaults sure, but don't slowly turn the internet into a cable
distribution system because "they're just users". It's bad enough already,
don't make it worse trying to solve every issue with the nuclear option
before trying anything else.
On Wed, Jul 31, 2013 at 10:17 AM, Thomas St-Pierre <tstpierre at iweb.com>wrote:
> The problem isn't the people on this list leaving the public snmp
> community on their devices, it's the vendors of home routers leaving it
> there in their devices. Normal end users don't know or even care what snmp
> is. (nor can we expect them too)
> A simple scan of a large cable/dsl ISP's address space will likely net you
> tens of thousands of devices which respond to the "public" snmp community.
> On 13-07-31 10:57 AM, "Blake Dunlap" <ikiris at gmail.com> wrote:
> >This looks like more a security issue with the devices, not border
> >If you're seeing replies of that size, it means the devices themselves are
> >set up to allow public queries of their information (not secured by even
> >keys), which no one should be comfortable with. People should never be
> >leaving the public access snmp strings on devices even if they are
> >internal. Edge blocking just masks the real issue.
> >On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 11:25 PM, bottiger <bottiger10 at gmail.com> wrote:
> >> Before you skim past this email because you already read the Prolexic
> >> report on it or some other article on the internet, there are 2
> >> disturbing properties that I haven't found anywhere else online.
> >> 1) After sending abuse emails to many networks, we received many angry
> >> replies that they monitored their traffic for days without seeing
> >> anything (even as we were being attacked) and that their IPs were
> >> spoofed and would block us for spamming them.
> >> What we discovered was that their firewalls/routers/gateways coming
> >> from vendors like Cisco and SonicWall apparently didn't record SNMP
> >> traffic going in or out of themselves. We confirmed this multiple
> >> times by running a query to an IP that was claimed to be clean and
> >> watching the response come 10-60 seconds later because the device was
> >> being so heavily abused.
> >> 2) SNMP reflection offers the largest amplification factor by far,
> >> even surpassing DNS, Chargen, or NTP by a wide margin. I have tested a
> >> 68 byte query and received responses of up to 30,000 to 60,000 bytes.
> >> The trick is to use GetBulkRequest to start enumerating from the first
> >> OID and setting max repetitions to a large number. This is contrary to
> >> the other articles online which suggest a much smaller amplification
> >> factor with other queries.
> >> This protocol is also prevalent in many devices ranging from routers
> >> to printers.
> >> To solve this problem you should block SNMP traffic coming from
> >> outside your network and whitelist outside IPs that require it.
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