Gmail and SSL

Steven Bellovin smb at cs.columbia.edu
Thu Jan 3 21:25:45 UTC 2013


On Jan 3, 2013, at 3:52 PM, Matthias Leisi <matthias at leisi.net> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 3, 2013 at 4:59 AM, Damian Menscher <damian at google.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> While I'm writing, I'll also point out that the Diginotar hack which came
>> up in this discussion as an example of why CAs can't be trusted was
>> discovered due to a feature of Google's Chrome browser when a cert was
>> 
> 
> Similar to
> http://googleonlinesecurity.blogspot.ch/2013/01/enhancing-digital-certificate-security.html?
> 
Thanks; I was just about to post that link to this thread.

Certificates don't spread virally, and random browsers don't go looking
for whatever interesting certificates they find.  They also don't like
certs that say "*.google.com" when the user is trying to go somewhere else;
that web site would be non-functional unless it was trying to impersonate
a Google domain.  Taken all together, this sounds to me like deliberate
mischief by someone.  In fact, were it not for the facts that the blog
post says that Google learned of this on December 24 and this thread started
on December 14, I'd wonder if there was a connection -- was this the
incident that made Google reassess its threat model?

Of course, this attack was carried out within the official PKI framework...

		--Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb








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