questions regarding prefix hijacking

Wed Aug 7 08:40:34 UTC 2013

Unfortunately, it is way too easy for people to inject routes into the
global routing system.

I think most of the folks on the list can attest to that. :-)

- ferg

On Wed, Aug 7, 2013 at 1:20 AM, Martin T <m4rtntns at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> as probably many of you know, it's possible to create a "route" object
> to RIPE database for an address space which is allocated outside the
> RIPE region using the RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT maintainer object. For example
> an address space is from APNIC or ARIN region and AS is from RIPE
> region. For example a LIR in RIPE region creates a "route" object to
> RIPE database for 157.166.266.0/24(used by Turner Broadcasting System)
> prefix without having written permission from Turner Broadcasting
> System and as this LIR uses up-link providers who create prefix
> filters automatically according to RADb database entries, this ISP is
> soon able to announce this 157.166.266.0/24 prefix to Internet. This
> should disturb the availability of the real 157.166.266.0/24 network
> on Internet? Has there been such situations in history? Isn't there a
> method against such hijacking? Or have I misunderstood something and
> this isn't possible?
>
>
> regards,
> Martin
>

-- 
"Fergie", a.k.a. Paul Ferguson
 fergdawgster(at)gmail.com