William was raided for running a Tor exit node. Please help if you can.

Thu Nov 29 20:53:23 UTC 2012

On Thu, Nov 29, 2012 at 12:42 PM, Naslund, Steve <SNaslund at medline.com> wrote:
> The entire point of Tor is to be untraceable back to the source.  Egress
> filters can prevent future abuse but do not provide for tracing back to
> the original source of offending conduct. They are not trying to stop
> the flow of the data in this case, they want the source in jail.  If law
> enforcement comes to you and asks you to show them the source or
> destination on a case like the one in question, you cannot comply and if
> law enforcement asks you to trap this data in the future you will also
> have a problem complying because I think you cannot identify the
> original source.

If you run an open wireless access point and don't log MACs / MAC to
IP DHCP assignments, you are in similar straights.

If they come to you 31 days after the data flow and you retain logs
for 30, you are in similar straights.

If someone faked their wireless MAC and the data in your log is not
definitive, everyone's stymied.

If someone went into a Library and used an open access computer,
there's often no log of who / when.

The assertion being made here, that it's somehow illegal (or immoral,
or scary) for there to be not-completely-traceable internet access in
the US, is absurd.

CALEA doesn't say what you're asserting.  From the First Report and Order:

"24. In this section, we find that facilities-based providers of any
type of broadband Internet access
service, including but not limited to wireline, cable modem,
satellite, wireless, fixed wireless, and
broadband access via powerline are subject to CALEA"  (
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-153A1.pdf  )

If you're not a facilities-based provider, you aren't covered.

-- 
-george william herbert
george.herbert at gmail.com