LinkedIn password database compromised

Leo Bicknell bicknell at ufp.org
Wed Jun 20 21:39:14 UTC 2012


In a message written on Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 02:19:15PM -0700, Leo Vegoda wrote:
> Key management: doing it right is hard and probably beyond most end users.

I could not be in more violent disagreement.

First time a user goes to sign up on a web page, the browser should
detect it wants a key uploaded and do a simple wizard.

  - Would you like to create an online identity for logging into web
    sites?    Yes, No, Import

User says yes, it creates a key, asking for an e-mail address to
identify it.  Import to drag it in from some other program/format,
No and you can't sign up.

Browser now says "would you like to sign up for website 'foobar.com'",
and if the user says "yes" it submits their public key including the
e-mail they are going to use to log on.  User doesn't even fill out
a form at all.

Web site still does the usual e-mail the user, click this link to verify
you want to sign up thing.

User goes back to web site later, browser detects "auth needed" and
"public key foo" accepted, presents the cert, and the user is logged in.

Notice that these steps _remove_ the user filling out forms to sign up
for simple web sites, and filling out forms to log in.  Anyone who's
used cert-based auth at work is already familiar, the web site
"magically" knows you.  This is MUCH more user friendly.

So the big magic here is the user has to click on "yes" to create a key
and type in an e-mail once.  That's it.  There's no web of trust.  No
identity verification (a-la ssl).  I'm talking a very SSH like system,
but with more polish.

Users would find it much more convenient and wonder why we ever used
passwords, I think...

-- 
       Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440
        PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/
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