Why not to use RPKI (Was Re: Argus: a hijacking alarm system)

Richard Barnes richard.barnes at gmail.com
Fri Jan 20 10:29:51 CST 2012


BBN has also released an initial version of their relying party
software.  Core features are basically the same as the other
validators (namely, RPKI certificate validation), with
-- more fine-grained error diagnostics and
-- more robust support for the RTR protocol for distributing validated
information to routers.
<http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/msg03854.html>


On Fri, Jan 20, 2012 at 9:39 AM, Alex Band <alexb at ripe.net> wrote:
> If you want to play around with RPKI Origin Validation, you can download the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator here: http://ripe.net/certification/tools-and-resources
> It's simple to set up and use: just unzip the package on a *NIX system, run ./bin/rpki-validator and browse to http://localhost:8080
>
> EuroTransit have a public one running here:
> http://rpki01.fra2.de.euro-transit.net:8080/
>
> You can see it's pointing to several Trust Anchors, downloads and validates all ROA periodically, you can apply ignore filters and white lists, see a BGP announcement validity preview based on route collector data, integrates with existing (RPSL based) workflows and can talk to RPKI-capable routers.
>
> If you want to get an idea of how an RPKI-capable router would be configured, here's some sample config for Cisco and Juniper:
> http://www.ripe.net/certification/router-configuration
>
> You can also log into a public RPKI-capable Juniper here: 193.34.50.25, 193.34.50.26
> telnet username: rpki
> password: testbed
>
> With additional documentation available here:
> http://rpki01.fra2.de.euro-transit.net/documentation.html
>
> Have fun,
>
> Alex
>
> On 20 Jan 2012, at 13:08, Arturo Servin wrote:
>
>>
>>       You could use RPKI and origin validation as well.
>>
>>       We have an application that does that.
>>
>>       http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/
>>
>>       For example you can periodically check if your prefix is valid:
>>
>> http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/valid/cidr/200.7.84.0/23/
>>
>>       If it were invalid for a possible hijack it would look like:
>>
>> http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/invalid/cidr/200.31.18.0/24/
>>
>>       Or you can just query for any state:
>>
>> http://www.labs.lacnic.net/rpkitools/looking_glass/rest/all/cidr/200.31.12.0/22/
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>> as
>>
>> On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:47, Yang Xiang wrote:
>>
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> I build a system ‘Argus’ to real-timely alert prefix hijackings.
>>> Argus monitors the Internet and discovers anomaly BGP updates which caused
>>> by prefix hijacking.
>>> When Argus discovers a potential prefix hijacking, it will advertise it in
>>> a very short time,
>>> both in our website (http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn) and the
>>> mailing list (argus at csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn).
>>>
>>> Argus has been running in the Internet for more than eight months,
>>> it usually can discover potential prefix hijackings in ten seconds after
>>> the first anomaly BGP update announced.
>>> Several hijacking alarms have been confirmed by network operators.
>>> For example: http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/fingerprints/61544/ has
>>> been confirmed by the network operators of AS23910 and AS4538,
>>> it was a prefix hijacking caused by a mis-configuration of route filter.
>>>
>>> If you are interest in BGP security, welcome to visit our website and
>>> subscribe the mailing list.
>>> If you are interest in the system itself, you can find our paper which
>>> published in ICNP 2011 (FIST workshop)
>>> http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=6089080.
>>>
>>> Hope Argus will be useful for you.
>>> _________________________________
>>> Yang Xiang . about.me/xiangyang
>>> Ph.D candidate. Tsinghua University
>>> Argus: argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn
>>
>>
>



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