Why not to use RPKI (Was Re: Argus: a hijacking alarm system)
alexb at ripe.net
Fri Jan 20 08:39:19 CST 2012
If you want to play around with RPKI Origin Validation, you can download the RIPE NCC RPKI Validator here: http://ripe.net/certification/tools-and-resources
It's simple to set up and use: just unzip the package on a *NIX system, run ./bin/rpki-validator and browse to http://localhost:8080
EuroTransit have a public one running here:
You can see it's pointing to several Trust Anchors, downloads and validates all ROA periodically, you can apply ignore filters and white lists, see a BGP announcement validity preview based on route collector data, integrates with existing (RPSL based) workflows and can talk to RPKI-capable routers.
If you want to get an idea of how an RPKI-capable router would be configured, here's some sample config for Cisco and Juniper:
You can also log into a public RPKI-capable Juniper here: 18.104.22.168, 22.214.171.124
telnet username: rpki
With additional documentation available here:
On 20 Jan 2012, at 13:08, Arturo Servin wrote:
> You could use RPKI and origin validation as well.
> We have an application that does that.
> For example you can periodically check if your prefix is valid:
> If it were invalid for a possible hijack it would look like:
> Or you can just query for any state:
> On 20 Jan 2012, at 07:47, Yang Xiang wrote:
>> I build a system ‘Argus’ to real-timely alert prefix hijackings.
>> Argus monitors the Internet and discovers anomaly BGP updates which caused
>> by prefix hijacking.
>> When Argus discovers a potential prefix hijacking, it will advertise it in
>> a very short time,
>> both in our website (http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn) and the
>> mailing list (argus at csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn).
>> Argus has been running in the Internet for more than eight months,
>> it usually can discover potential prefix hijackings in ten seconds after
>> the first anomaly BGP update announced.
>> Several hijacking alarms have been confirmed by network operators.
>> For example: http://argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn/fingerprints/61544/ has
>> been confirmed by the network operators of AS23910 and AS4538,
>> it was a prefix hijacking caused by a mis-configuration of route filter.
>> If you are interest in BGP security, welcome to visit our website and
>> subscribe the mailing list.
>> If you are interest in the system itself, you can find our paper which
>> published in ICNP 2011 (FIST workshop)
>> Hope Argus will be useful for you.
>> Yang Xiang . about.me/xiangyang
>> Ph.D candidate. Tsinghua University
>> Argus: argus.csnet1.cs.tsinghua.edu.cn
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