Possible New Zero Day Microsoft Windows 3389 vulnerability - outbound traffic 3389

Mark Keymer mark at viviotech.net
Fri Jan 13 17:02:03 UTC 2012


We have had 2 of the below hit us this week. First time was apx 11:20am 
1/10/2012 (PST). The 2nd was 1/12/2012 (Yesterday) 4:45pm. We had done 
some research and had already planed to switch to Network Level 
Authentication (NLA) as it looks like that would help with the screen 
not getting dumped. Unfortunately we had not done the change to that yet 
as we were getting looking for and found a new RDP client on linux that 
would support it. However last night we did start doing the changes to NLA.

I am not saying NLA is a fix or that it is the best option. Just one of 
the things we are trying. When we can, locking down access to the RDP 
port I think would be best.

Ohh, as for the destination. The first day was to 
Yesterday was for


Mark Keymer

On 1/13/2012 4:36 AM, James Braunegg wrote:
> Hey All,
> Just posting to see if anyone has seen any strange outbound traffic on port 3389 from Microsoft Windows Server over the last few hours.
> We witnessed an alarming amount of completely independent Microsoft Windows Servers,  each on separate vlan and subnets (ie all /30 and /29 allocations) with separate gateways on and completely separate customers, but all services were within the same 1.x.x.x/16 allocation all simultaneously send around 2mbit or so data to a specific target IP address.
> The only common link was / is terminal services port 3389 is open to the public. Obviously someone (Mr 133t dude) scanned an allocation within our network, and like a worm was able to simultaneously control every Microsoft Windows Server to send outbound traffic.
> Microsoft Windows Servers within the 1.x.x.x/16 allocation which were behind a firewall or VPN and did not have public 3389 access did not send the unknown traffic
> Would be very interested if anyone else has seen this behavior before ! Or is this the start of a lovely new Zero Day Vulnerability with Windows RDP, if so I name it "ohDeer-RDP"
> A sample of the traffic is as per below, collected from netflow
> Source                  Destination         Application         Src          Port       Dst
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       51534    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       52699    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       60824    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       51669    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       49215    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       62099    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       65429    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       51965    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       50381    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       59379    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       58103    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       59514    TCP
> x.x.x.x/16         ms-wbt-server  3389       58298    TCP
> This occurred around 10:30pm AEST Friday the 13th of January 2012
> We had many other Microsoft Windows Servers in other 2.x.x.x/16 IP ranges which were totally unaffected.
> Kindest Regards
> James Braunegg
> W:  1300 769 972  |  M:  0488 997 207 |  D:  (03) 9751 7616
> E:   james.braunegg at micron21.com<mailto:james.braunegg at micron21.com>   |  ABN:  12 109 977 666
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