AD and enforced password policies

Todd Underwood toddunder at
Tue Jan 3 13:22:09 UTC 2012

works well.  has plausible analysis of the entropy of the passphrases
created.  it's 100% prescriptive and deterministic so can be used for
large, unevenly skilled userbases.  the passphrases are easy to
remember and type for english speakers (and there are alternative

and it wouldn't pass any of these silly requirements.

what people really need to be doing is deploying:

there are free apps for android and iphone to generate sequences as a
2nd factor.


On Tue, Jan 3, 2012 at 8:09 AM, Greg Ihnen <os10rules at> wrote:
> On Jan 3, 2012, at 4:14 AM, Måns Nilsson wrote:
>> Subject: RE: AD and enforced password policies Date: Mon, Jan 02, 2012 at 11:15:08PM +0000 Quoting Blake T. Pfankuch (blake at
>>> However I would say 365 day expiration is a little long, 3 months is about the average in a non financial oriented network.
>> If you force me to change a password every three months, I'm going
>> to start doing "g0ddw/\ssPOrd-01", ..-02, etc immediately. Net result,
>> you lose.
>> Let's face it, either the bad guys have LANMAN hashes/unsalted MD5 etc,
>> and we're all doomed, or they will be lucky and guess. None of these
>> attack modes will be mitigated by the 3-month scheme; success/fail as
>> seen by the bad guys will be a lot quicker than three months. If they
>> do not get lucky with john or rainbow tables, they'll move on.
>> (Some scenarios still are affected by this, of course, but there is a
>> lot to be done to stop bad things from happening like not getting your
>> hashes stolen etc. On-line repeated login failures aren't going to work
>> because you'll detect that, right? )
>> Either way, expiring often is the first and most effective step at making
>> the lusers hate you and will only bring the Post-It(tm) makers happy.
>> If your password crypto is NSA KW-26 or similar, OTOH, just
>> don the Navy blues and start swapping punchcards at 0000 ZULU.
>>       (
>> --
>> Måns Nilsson     primary/secondary/besserwisser/machina
>> MN-1334-RIPE                             +46 705 989668
> A side issue is the people who use the same password at as they do at Of course fuzzykittens doesn't need high security for their password management and storage. After all, what's worth stealing at fuzzykittens? All those passwords.  I use and recommend and use a popular password manager, so I can have unique strong passwords without making a religion out of it.
> Greg

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