do not filter your customers

Nick Hilliard nick at
Fri Feb 24 23:16:06 UTC 2012

On 24/02/2012 20:04, Shane Amante wrote:
> Solving for route leaks is /the/ "killer app" for BGPSEC.  I can't
> understand why people keep ignoring this.

I'd be interested to hear your opinions on exactly how rpki in its current
implementation would have prevented the optus/telstra problem.  Could you

Here's a quote from draft-ietf-sidr-origin-ops:

>    As the BGP origin AS of an update is not signed, origin validation is
>    open to malicious spoofing.  Therefore, RPKI-based origin validation
>    is designed to deal only with inadvertent mis-advertisement.
>    Origin validation does not address the problem of AS-Path validation.
>    Therefore paths are open to manipulation, either malicious or
>    accidental.

An optus/telstra style problem might have been mitigated by an rpki based
full path validation mechanism, but we don't have path validation.  Right
now, we only have a draft of a list of must-have features -
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-reqs.  This is only the first step towards designing
a functional protocol, not to mind having running code.


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