joelja at bogus.com
Mon Feb 20 21:00:56 UTC 2012
On 2/20/12 09:57 , Christopher Morrow wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 20, 2012 at 10:38 AM, Tei <oscar.vives at gmail.com> wrote:
>> I am a mere user, so I all this stuff sounds to me like giberish.
>> The right solution is to capture the request to these DNS servers, and
>> send to a custom server with a static message "warning.html". Nothing
>> fancy. With a phone number to "get out of jail", so people can call
>> to "op-out" of this thing, so can browse the internet to search for a
> in this case, the fbi/dns-changer case, the information is pretty
> straightforward for theisp folk... 'client machine makes dns queries
> not to the isp dns server (or one of several free dns services), but
> to a known bad set of netblocks'
> the easy fix is to just stand up (forever, ha!) dns servers on the ip
> blocks inside the ISP's network, done and done...
given the size and distribution of the ip blocks in question I doubt
very much that they will go unused forever...
from a previous message in this thread.
Quoting the FBI:
188.8.131.52 through 184.108.40.206
220.127.116.11 through 18.104.22.168
22.214.171.124 through 126.96.36.199
188.8.131.52 through 184.108.40.206
220.127.116.11 through 18.104.22.168
22.214.171.124 through 126.96.36.199
which map quite nice to various rir prefix assigments. it's almost like
someone cribbed the whois inetnum field when they loaded their scattergun...
inetnum: 188.8.131.52 - 184.108.40.206
while I have no doubt that some of those prefixes my be run by rather
than simply host to bad actors, if they're returned to rirs, they will
be assigned again, so a static filter policy will return to bite us
again like it always does.
> they can then start
> notifying the customers via mail/email/carrier-pidgeon that they are
> infected, along with instructions about how to get un-infected.
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