Hijacked Network Ranges

Christopher Morrow morrowc.lists at gmail.com
Sun Feb 5 23:14:20 CST 2012


On Mon, Feb 6, 2012 at 12:07 AM, Mark Tinka <mtinka at globaltransit.net> wrote:

> It's 2012, we really shouldn't be seeing this type of thing
> anymore, particularly after what happened in Pakistan.

s/pakistan/pakistan,nyc(ntt),minneapolis(ntt),level3's incidents, .../

there's lots of people that have fallen victim of:
  o not having filters at all (pccw/pktel)
  o filtering using old/stale data (ntt/l3)

why aren't filters applied at all? ("its hard, people keep asking me
to update them, bah! work!")
why aren't filter data bases kept up to date? ("its hard, i have to
email something to radb/altdb/etc... bah, work!")
why aren't checks of the filter data simple and mechanical? (and
accurate?) ("Bah! work! plus, have you looked at the ouptput? bah!
work!")

resource certification would at least get us to the point where
checking the data in the IRR is 'easy', it's not going to get people
to PUT FILTERS ON CUSTOMER SESSIONS, and it's not going to get people
to update their IRR objects (add AND DELETE!!!)

-chris



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