[#135346] Unauthorized BGP Announcements (follow up to Hijacked Networks)

Blake Dunlap ikiris at gmail.com
Wed Feb 1 21:35:08 UTC 2012

On Wed, Feb 1, 2012 at 15:21, George Bonser <gbonser at seven.com> wrote:

> > The problem is no one will actually blacklist a big ASN because its not
> > in the individual best interest, which scales greatly with size. RPKI
> > is pretty much the only real fix for this if the chain until the major
> > carrier refuses to delist, and RPKI has it's own issues.
> >
> > -Blake
> Sadly, you're right. But my guess is that such a blacklisting would have
> to be done for only a very short period of time and once it is done once or
> twice, it would never need to be done again.  But it probably is too big a
> hammer.
> Until there is some sort of registry that is the source of truth and is
> easy to use (distributed?), we're going to keep repeating this process.
The issue isn't getting the AS blacklisted, the issue is getting people to
use the blacklist. Would you trust your router accepting entire ASNs to
someone else's list? Would your boss agree to allow others to shut down
access to a potentially major entity on the internet for something that
doesn't directly impact you?

I just don't see it ever happening, and anything short of that is no
deterrent for the above.

If you can't target the enablers with any kind of stick, then the only
other option is RPKI which prevents the actual hijack, but that has it's
own issues, due to the same benefits.


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