Gmail and SSL

Christopher Morrow morrowc.lists at gmail.com
Sun Dec 30 20:34:19 UTC 2012


On Sun, Dec 30, 2012 at 3:30 PM, Keith Medcalf <kmedcalf at dessus.com> wrote:
> Your assertion that using "bought" certificates provides any security benefit whatsoever assumes facts not in evidence.
>
> Given recent failures in this space I would posit that the requirement to use certificates purchased from entities "under the thumb" of government control, clearly motivated only by profit, and with highly questionable moral and ethical standards represents a huge increase in risk of passive attack and confidentiality failure where such rosk did not previously exist.
>

backing up some, I think the problem trying to be solved by requiring
'legitimate' certificates is stopping the obvious problems of mitm
attacks, ala mallory-proxy.

in the longer term, if the client can know that the server was
supposed to present a cert with fingerprint XFOOBYFOOB and it can see
that fingerprint for the cert presented in the session we all win,
right?



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