rpki vs. secure dns?
alexb at ripe.net
Sun Apr 29 15:38:39 CDT 2012
On 29 Apr 2012, at 22:03, David Conrad wrote:
> On Apr 29, 2012, at 8:16 AM, Alex Band wrote:
>> All in all, for an RPKI-specific court order to be effective in taking a network offline, the RIR would have to tamper with the registry, inject false data and try to make sure it's not detected so nobody applies a local override.
> I suspect the court order would simply say something like 'RIPE-NCC must, upon pain of contempt of court, take sufficient steps to invalidate the allocations made to customer X' and leave it up to you all to figure out how to do it. I doubt they'd care all that much about implementation details. Are you saying it is not possible for RIPE-NCC staff to do this? I also doubt the court would care too much about 'local override' as the "Tyranny of Defaults" would be sufficient for their needs (and they could probably sanction the folks in the Netherlands who they discovered did the override).
> As Randy points out, this is not unique to SIDR-defined RPKI. It is applicable to any top-down hierarchical authorization mechanism. Security has (non-monetary) costs.
Thanks David, I know that a court order doesn't have to specific. I just want to make people aware that in the case of RPKI, things are not as clear cut as "Revoked ROA = Offline network". It depends on many factors and I just want to offer a little perspective of what's involved.
(P.S. I'm going on holiday for a week without internet access, so I won't be able to follow up on this thread for a while)
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Size: 2355 bytes
Desc: not available
More information about the NANOG