rpki vs. secure dns?

Stephane Bortzmeyer bortzmeyer at nic.fr
Sat Apr 28 07:57:58 CDT 2012

On Sat, Apr 28, 2012 at 12:34:52PM +0200,
 Alex Band <alexb at ripe.net> wrote 
 a message of 41 lines which said:

> In reality, since the RIRs launched an RPKI production service on 1
> Jan 2011, adoption has been incredibly good (for example compared to
> IPv6 and DNSSEC). More than 1500 ISPs and large organizations
> world-wide have opted-in to the system and requested a resource
> certificate using the hosted service, or running an open source
> package with their own CA. 

I have an experience with the deployment of DNSSEC and the problem
with DNSSEC was not to have signed zones (many are, now) but to have
people *using* these signatures to check the data (i.e. validating in
a resolver).

RPKI has many ROA (signed objects) but how many operators validate
routes on their production routers? Zero?

> But it's not just that, these ISPs didn't just blindly get
> certificate and walk away.

Most of the ROAs are very recent. Again, the experience with DNSSEC
shows that starting is easy ("DNSSEC in siw minutes"). It's long term
management which is *the* problem. Wait until people start to change
the routing data and watch the ROAs becoming less and less correct...

> Data quality is really good. 

It's not what you said:

"It is safe to say that overall data quality is pretty bad"
(good paper, by the way, thanks)

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