Why are we still using the CA model? (Re: Microsoft deems all DigiNotar certificates untrustworthy, releases updates)

Michael Thomas mike at mtcc.com
Mon Sep 12 15:09:59 UTC 2011

Randy Bush wrote:
>>> with dane, i trust whoever runs dns for citibank to identify the cert
>>> for citibank.  this seems much more reasonable than other approaches,
>>> though i admit to not having dived deeply into them all.
>> If the root DNS keys were compromised in an all DNS rooted world...
>> unhappiness would ensue in great volume.
> as eliot pointed out, to defeat dane as currently written, you would
> have to compromise dnssec at the same time as you compromised the CA at
> the same time as you ran the mitm.  i.e. it _adds_ dnssec assurance to
> CA trust.

Yes, I saw that. It also drives up complexity too and makes you wonder what
the added value of those cert vendors is for the money you're forking over.
Especially when you consider the criticality of dns naming for everything
except web site host names using tls. And how long would it be before browsers
allowed self-signed-but-ok'ed-using-dnssec-protected-cert-hashes?


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