Microsoft deems all DigiNotar certificates untrustworthy, releases updates
dwhite at olp.net
Sat Sep 10 03:35:40 UTC 2011
On 09/09/11 20:06 -0700, Michael DeMan wrote:
>Sorry for being ignorant here - I have not even been aware that it is
>possible to buy a '*.*.com' domain at all.
>I though wildcards were limited to having a domain off a TLD - like '*.mydomain.tld'.
>Is it true that the my browser on a windows, mac, or linux desktop may
>have listed as trusted authorities, an outfit that sells '*.*.tld' ?
The issue is that a trusted third party's (Diginotar) trusted signing
certificate was stolen, allowing the holder to create and sign whatever
certificates he wished, which don't necessarily need to be wildcard certs
to be effective.
Certificate signers are not restricted to any domain hierarchy (a design
feature of x.509 pki), which means that *any* trusted stolen signing
certificate can wreak havok on the trusted nature of x.509.
Even the hint that the claimed Diginotar cracker has gotten her hands
on several other signing certificates may be significant motivation to find
a replacement for the existing x.509 based pki.
>On Sep 9, 2011, at 2:54 PM, Paul wrote:
>> On 09/09/2011 11:48 AM, Marcus Reid wrote:
>>> On Wed, Sep 07, 2011 at 09:17:10AM -0700, Network IP Dog wrote:
>>>> Google and Mozilla have also updated their browsers to block all DigiNotar
>>>> certificates, while Apple has been silent on the issue, a emblematic zombie
>>> Apple has sent out a notification saying that they are removing
>>> DigiNotar from their list of trusted root certs.
>>> I like this response; instant CA death penalty seems to put the
>>> incentives about where they need to be.
>> Instant? This has been going on for over a week, and a lot of damage could have been done in that time, especially given certs for *.*.com were signed against Diginotar. Most cell phones are unable to update their certificates without an upgrade and you know how long it takes to get them through Cell Phone carriers. A number of alternative android builds are adding the ability to control accepted root certs to their builds in the interest of speeding this up. The CA system is fundamentally flawed.
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