First real-world SCADA attack in US
smb at cs.columbia.edu
Tue Nov 22 20:07:08 CST 2011
On Nov 22, 2011, at 8:08 58PM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
> On Nov 22, 2011, at 7:51 59PM, Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu wrote:
>> On Tue, 22 Nov 2011 13:32:23 -1000, Michael Painter said:
>>> And "In addition, DHS and FBI have concluded that there was no malicious traffic from Russia or any foreign entities, as
>>> previously reported."
>> It's interesting to read the rest of the text while doing some deconstruction:
>> "There is no evidence to support claims made in the initial Fusion Center
>> report ... that any credentials were stolen, or that the vendor was involved
>> in any malicious activity that led to a pump failure at the water plant."
>> Notice that they're carefully framing it as "no evidence that credentials were
>> stolen" - while carefully tap-dancing around the fact that you don't need to
>> steal credentials in order to totally pwn a box via an SQL injection or a PHP
>> security issue, or to log into a box that's still got the vendor-default
>> userid/passwords on them. You don't need to steal the admin password
>> if Google tells you the default login is "admin/admin" ;)
>> "No evidence that the vendor was involved" - *HAH*. When is the vendor *EVER*
>> involved? The RSA-related hacks of RSA's customers are conspicuous by their
>> And I've probably missed a few weasel words in there...
> They do state categorically that "After detailed analysis, DHS and the
> FBI have found no evidence of a cyber intrusion into the SCADA system of
> the Curran-Gardner Public Water District in Springfield, Illinois."
> I'm waiting to see Joe Weiss's response.
--Steve Bellovin, https://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
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