Verisign Internet Defence Network
joelja at bogus.com
Mon May 30 15:05:19 UTC 2011
Normally when mitigation is put in place, they advertise a more specific prefix from as26415, scrub the traffic and hand it back to you over a gre tunnel...
Obviously some design consideration goes into having services in prefixes you're willing to de-agg in such a fashion... I'd also recommend advertising the more specific out your own ingress paths before they pull your route otherwise the churn while various ASes grind through their longer backup routes takes a while.
On May 30, 2011, at 7:43 AM, Rubens Kuhl wrote:
> ms made by the product descriptions seem suspect to me.
>> it claims to be "Carrier-agnostic and ISP-neutral", yet "When an event is
>> detected, Verisign will work with the customer to redirect Internet traffic
>> destined for the protected service to a Verisign Internet Defense Network
>> anyone here have any comments on how this works, and how effective it will be
>> vs. dealing directly with your upstream providers and getting them to assist
>> in shutting down the attack?
> Anyone willing to announce your IP blocks under attack, receive the
> traffic and then tunnel the non-attack traffic back to you can provide
> such services without cooperation from your upstreams. I don't know
> the details about this particular provider, such as if they announce
> your blocks from yours or theirs ASN, if they use more specifics,
> communities or is simply very well connected, but as BGP on the DFZ
> goes, it can work.
> You might need to get your upstreams to not filter announcements from
> your IP block they receive, because that would prevent mitigation for
> attack traffic from inside your upstream AS.
> (RPKI could also be a future challenge for such service, but one could
> previously sign ROAs to be used in an attack response)
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