Suspecious anycast prefixes

bmanning at bmanning at
Thu May 5 18:32:14 UTC 2011

On Thu, May 05, 2011 at 12:27:04PM -0400, Danny McPherson wrote:
> On May 5, 2011, at 11:58 AM, David Miller wrote:
> > 
> > IF things are not functioning properly and the operator of the service is depending on end consumers of the service to notify them of which node is malfunctioning, then it is time for the operator of the service to go back to the drawing board and improve their monitoring and failure resolution systems.
> Hehh..  As you well know, there are many folks that invest 
> enormous time and money into this, and yet realize, that ultimately, 
> there are influencers in the routing system and data path between 
> the client and the service node that the service operators can't 
> control.  All they can do is best enable service consumers to 
> identify and incorporate controls that are optimal for their operating 
> environments.
> > ...but it *is* expressly about selection of nodes...
> It enables visibility and transparency which can be employed to 
> inform measurement and detection systems.  IF / how an operator 
> chooses to apply controls based on that information (e.g., drop 
> a prefix originated from an unauthorized origin AS or leaked via 
> a known bad path) that's certainly their prerogative.
> -danny

	hum...  from the service operator perspective, it seems that the operating mode is to reduce latency
	for the requesting client.  from the client perspective, latency may not be the most important thing

	too bad the anycast fabrics only take the needs of the service operator into account... :(


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