Suspecious anycast prefixes

Danny McPherson danny at
Thu May 5 16:27:04 UTC 2011

On May 5, 2011, at 11:58 AM, David Miller wrote:
> IF things are not functioning properly and the operator of the service is depending on end consumers of the service to notify them of which node is malfunctioning, then it is time for the operator of the service to go back to the drawing board and improve their monitoring and failure resolution systems.

Hehh..  As you well know, there are many folks that invest 
enormous time and money into this, and yet realize, that ultimately, 
there are influencers in the routing system and data path between 
the client and the service node that the service operators can't 
control.  All they can do is best enable service consumers to 
identify and incorporate controls that are optimal for their operating 

> ...but it *is* expressly about selection of nodes...

It enables visibility and transparency which can be employed to 
inform measurement and detection systems.  IF / how an operator 
chooses to apply controls based on that information (e.g., drop 
a prefix originated from an unauthorized origin AS or leaked via 
a known bad path) that's certainly their prerogative.


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