Using IPv6 with prefixes shorter than a /64 on a LAN
fernando at gont.com.ar
Sun Jan 30 20:24:47 CST 2011
On 30/01/2011 08:17 p.m., Matthew Petach wrote:
>>> The problem I see is the opening of a new, simple, DoS/DDoS scenario.
>>> By repetitively sweeping a targets /64 you can cause EVERYTHING in
>>> that /64 to stop working by overflowing the ND/ND cache, depending on
>>> the specific ND cache implementation and how big it is/etc.
>> That depends on the ND implementation being broken enough by not
>> limiting the number of neighbor cache entries that are in the INCOMPLETE
>> state. (I'm not saying those broken implementations don't exist, though).
> Even without completely overflowing the ND cache, informal lab testing
> shows that a single laptop on a well-connected network link can send
> sufficient packets at a very-large-scale backbone router's connected /64
> subnet to keep the router CPU at 90%, sustained, for as long as you'd
> like. So, while it's not a direct denial of service (the network keeps
> functioning, albeit under considerable pain), it's enough to impact the
> ability of the network to react to other dynamic loads. :/
This is very interesting data. Are you talking about Ciscos? Any
I guess that a possible mitigation technique (implementation-based)
would be to limit the number of ongoing addresses in address resolution.
(i.e., once you have X ongoing ND resolutions, the router should not be
engaged in ND for other addresses) -- note that addresses that the
router had already resolved in the past would not suffer from this
penalty, as their corresponding entries would be in states other than
e-mail: fernando at gont.com.ar || fgont at acm.org
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