Is NAT can provide some kind of protection?

William Herrin bill at herrin.us
Thu Jan 13 19:48:40 CST 2011


On Wed, Jan 12, 2011 at 10:02 PM, Mark Andrews <marka at isc.org> wrote:
> In message <AANLkTikiXF_mbuo-osKPjSW98vn5_d5WZNUi_PL37sNG at mail.gmail.com>, William
>  Herrin writes:
>> There's actually a large difference between something that's
>> impossible for a technology to do (even in theory), something that the
>> technology has been programmed not to do and something that a
>> technology is by default configured not to do.
>
> Well ask the firewall vendor not to give you the knob to open it
> up completely.

Hi Mark,

Why would I do that? I still have toes left; I *want* to be able to
shoot myself in the foot.

Still, you do follow the practical difference between can't,
programmed not to and configured not to, right? Can't is 0% chance of
a breach on that vector. The others are varying small percentages with
"configured" the highest of the bunch.


> Note the CPE NAT boxes I've seen all have the ability to send
> anything that isn't being NAT'd to a internal box so it isn't like
> NAT boxes don't already have the flaw you are complaining about.
> Usually it's labeled as DMZ host or something similar.

Fair enough. Implementations that can't target -something- for
unsolicited inbound packets have gotten rare.

The core point remains: a hacker trying to push packets at an
arbitrary host behind a NAT firewall has to not only find flaws in the
filtering rules, he also has to convince the firewall to send the
packet to the "right" host. This is more difficult. The fact that the
firewall doesn't automatically send the packet to the right host once
the filtering flaw is discovered adds an extra layer of security.
Practically speaking, the hacker will have better luck trying to
corrupt data actually solicited by interior hosts that the difficulty
getting the box to send unsolicited packets to the host the hacker
wants to attack puts and end to the whole attack vector.


On Thu, Jan 13, 2011 at 4:21 PM, Lamar Owen <lowen at pari.edu> wrote:
> On Wednesday, January 12, 2011 03:50:28 pm Owen DeLong wrote:
>> That's simply not true. Every end user running NAT is
>> running a stateful firewall with a default inbound deny.
>
> This is demonstrably not correct.

Hi Lamar,

I have to side with Owen on this one. When a packet arrives at the
external interface of a NAT device, it's looked up in the NAT state
table. If no matching state is found, the packet is discarded. However
it came about, that describes a firewall and it is stateful.

Even if you route the packets somewhere instead of discarding them,
you've removed them from the data streams associated with the
individual interior hosts that present on the same exterior address.
Hence, a firewall.

There's no such thing as a pure router any more. As blurry as the line
has gotten it can be attractive to think of selectively acting on
packets with the same IP address pairs as a routing function, but it's
really not... and where the function is to divert undesired packets
from the hosts that don't want them (or the inverse -- divert desired
packets to the hosts that do want them), that's a firewall.

Regards,
Bill Herrin

-- 
William D. Herrin ................ herrin at dirtside.com  bill at herrin.us
3005 Crane Dr. ...................... Web: <http://bill.herrin.us/>
Falls Church, VA 22042-3004




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