A top-down RPKI model a threat to human freedom? (was Re: Level 3's IRR Database)

Tue Feb 1 21:48:18 UTC 2011

On Feb 1, 2011, at 1:36 PM, Michael Hallgren wrote:

> Le mardi 01 février 2011 à 13:20 -0800, Owen DeLong a écrit :
>> On Feb 1, 2011, at 9:14 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
>> 
>>> On Sun, Jan 30, 2011 at 2:55 PM, Martin Millnert <millnert at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>> Here be dragons,
>>> <snip>
>>>> It should be fairly obvious, by most recently what's going on in
>>>> Egypt, why allowing a government to control the Internet is a Really
>>>> Bad Idea.
>>>> 
>>> 
>>> how is the egypt thing related to rPKI?
>>> How is the propsed rPKI work related to gov't control?
>>> 
>> RPKI is a big knob governments might be tempted to turn.
>> 
>>>> architecturally/technologically *impossible* for a entity from country
>>>> A to via-the-hierarchical-trust-model block a prefix assigned to some
>>>> entity in country B, that is assigned by B's RIR and in full
>>>> accordance with the RIR policies and in no breach of any contract.
>>> 
>>> countries do not have RIR's, countries have NIR's... regions have RIR's.
>> 
>> RIRs live in countries with governments.
>> RIRs are unlikely to mount a successful challenge against an organization
>> with tanks and mortars.
> 
> Yes, right. But RIR is (at least supposed to be) regional, so
> (hopefully) more stable from a policy point of view (since the number of
> national "stake holders" need to agree on a common policy). In theory,
> at least...
> 
There is not a single RIR that is not physically located in a country.

You can hope they are more stable from a policy point of view, but, the
reality is that if someone shows up at the front door with tanks and
mortars, my money is not on the RIR.

Owen