Only 5x IPv4 /8 remaining at IANA

Mon Oct 18 18:16:30 UTC 2010

On Oct 18, 2010, at 10:52 AM, George Bonser wrote:

> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Owen DeLong [mailto:owen at delong.com]
>> Sent: Monday, October 18, 2010 9:25 AM
>> To: George Bonser
>> Cc: Henning Brauer; nanog at nanog.org
>> Subject: Re: Only 5x IPv4 /8 remaining at IANA
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Nobody is using dynamic nat pools to block inbound connections.
>> 
>> Many people are using dynamic NAT on top of stateful inspection where
>> stateful inspection blocks inbound connections.
>> 
>> The good news is that stateful inspection doesn't go away in IPv6. It
>> works
>> just fine. All that goes away is the header mangling.
> 
> Exactly true but there are people out there who experience it as
> "dynamic nat prevents inbound connections". And the extent to which
> state is inspected varies widely on different gear (is it just looking
> for an ACK flag to determine an "established" connection or is it making
> sure that at least one packet has gone in the other direction first?).

Looking for an ACK flag isn't Stateful inspection. Stateful inspection involves
comparison against a state table of known connections.

People perceive many things that are combined as having the systemic
effect without understanding which component actually performs which
underlying function. In cases where that doesn't matter, it's not an issue.
In IPv4, it didn't matter if people understood the difference between security
provided by stateful inspection and security eliminated by NAT.

Now, it matters because some people are claiming IPv6 is less secure
as a result of the lack of NAT. This claim comes from the misunderstanding
you have restated above.

> At least with dynamic (overload) NAT, a packet had to travel in the
> opposite (outbound) direction in order to establish the NAT in the first
> place. Then with an "established" acl, the two things give you fairly

This is true of stateful inspection as well. Stateful inspection != static
packet filters. It's not the same thing. The ACK flag test you describe
above is a static packet filter, not stateful inspection.

> decent assurance that things went as planned but are still not a
> substitute for packet inspection.
> 
Again, this doesn't come form the overloaded NAT. It comes from the
state table mechanism and the comparison of the packet against
known flows in the state table. While NAT requires this underlying
state table to function, there is nothing preventing implementation of
that state table without NAT. Such an implementation is equally
secure without NAT. In fact, it's slightly better because NAT destroys
audit trail while SI without NAT does not.

>> It's really unfortunate that most people don't understand the
>> distinction.
> 
> Concur.
> 
>> 
>> IPv6 with SI is no less secure than IPv4 with SI+NAT. 
> 
> Yup, the difference is going to be the extent to which the state is
> inspected in various gear.  Again, I believe firewall vendors are going
> to see a windfall here.
> 
You are confusing SI with Packet Filters. The technologies are different
and it is, also, important to understand this distinction as well.

> And to address your comment in an email subsequent to this one about
> accounting, I wholeheartedly agree.  NAT can make it much more difficult
> to find what is causing a problem or even who is talking to whom.

Actually, that was Tony Hain's comment, but, yes, he's correct.

Owen