Web expert on his 'catastrophe' key for the internet

James Hess mysidia at gmail.com
Thu Jul 29 23:55:38 CDT 2010

On Thu, Jul 29, 2010 at 10:23 PM, Franck Martin <franck at genius.com> wrote:
> Hmmm, from the interview of the British guy, the smart card seems to be in UK (he did a lapsus on it), which differs from what you describe.

You gotta read up on the whole ceremony and   their statement of
practices:   https://www.iana.org/dnssec/icann-dps.txt ...   Crypto
Officers are different from  Recovery Key Share Holders.
Crypto officers hold a key to a safe deposit box in the safe room
Safe 2,  containing the operator cards.
"Tier 5"

Each vault contains a Tamper-evident bag (TEB)  with a smart card
required to authenticate with the HSM to perform crypto operations.
Those cards don't leave the facility.
The operatorscards are  only authentication tokens,  the key is stored
on the hardware security modules.

Hardware security modules, and the laptop+DVD+USB Flash stick required
to operate them are stored in
tamper evident bags in Safe 1.

There are 7 crypto officers per site, but only  3 are required to
authenticate to the HSM  to enable it to perform operations.

The recovery key share holders  have a key to a bank safety deposit
box under _their own_ control,
containing a smartcard in  tamper-evident bag,     holding part of
the     HSM's  internal encryption key.

Each  RKSH has to provide and maintain records of where they are
storing their smartcard.
 7  RKSH per site, but only 5 are required for recovery operations.


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