On another security note... (of sorts)

J. Oquendo sil at infiltrated.net
Fri Jul 16 08:21:45 CDT 2010

Sean Donelan wrote:
> Damned if they do, Damned if they don't.
> It seems like every 4-6 weeks people alternate between ISPs are bad
> because they don't try to prevent X, Y or Z; and then 4-6 weeks later
> ISPs are bad because they tried to prevent A, B or C.  It doesn't matter
> what A, B, C or X, Y, Z are; it must be the ISPs fault.
> Everyone agrees that ISPs are bad, they just disagree about what ISPs
> are supposed to do about whatever.
> And so it goes...
Odd, I definitely don't recall saying outright ISP's are bad. More to
the tune of "ISP's can do more given they're in the best position to do
so..." which brings things full-circle, what can be done? How about an
RFC, then building from there. Anyone can comment about the potential of
"I'm not adding hundreds of thousands of null0's to my [email protected]" and the
point would be missed. As an NSP/NAP/ISP (pick your poison), you have
the potential to see where your machines are connecting to. And I don't
mean snooping their traffic outright, but its as simple as keeping tabs
on a "destination", if you KNOW and it has been CONFIRMED, that the
destination is a known purveyor "of un-fine" goods, wouldn't you like to
potentially help your clients before they become zombiefied?

If there was a method for operators to obtain information and share it,
(think an unbiased, validated, "most wanted" list) do you really want to
state that you wouldn't care about it, you couldn't use it. Surely I'd
like to use something similar and if I were in a position to do
something on a massive scale to eliminate bad traffic from 1) reaching
my customers (since money is obvious the main concern) and 2) from
making sure my customers don't affect your customers (YOUR money), I
would jump up and down on it doing whatever I could.

So it's not the ISP's are bad (at least to me they're not), it's more
like "ISP OPERATORS/OWNERS are too busy fighting AGAINST things like
this from happening, often spending more time and effort against it,
then they are trying to collaboratively solve a problem."

Analogy: "ALL gunmakers have seen their firearms mistakenly fire off at
will (purposefully or accidentally). They all agree that by putting a
safety mechanism, the rates of fatalities and injuries will go down.
Some choose not to, because after all, they would need to spend more
money to do so... Many protest against it: Smith and Wesson doesn't have
that, why should I?!... Fatalities continue and gunmakers complain: All
gunmakers are bad right, sure... uh-huh"

What's wrong with that analogy. What about responsibility. Forget the
politricks for a moment and think about the *ultimate* bottom line
here... Would you like to prevent someone from possibly wrecking havoc
on your personal bank account? Remember, what goes around comes around.
You're not only doing neighbors (peers) a favor but if collectively the
same approach was taken by many, there would be less "dirty traffic"
around. No one on this list can seriously counter this claim. We can get
into: "oh yea smart ass... They could [email protected] They could fast
flux!!!, they could..." Guess what? What is anyone going to do when they
can't connect?

src(my_compromised_machine):port --> dst(known_dirty_host_on_X_net)
My_NSP(hourly) ---> Mega_Peer_Dirty_Host_Watcher --> get_list_apply_filter


src(my_compromised_machine):port --> dst(known_dirty_host_on_X_net) -->
My_Provider --> ::1

Anyway, just a thought, maybe a far out there thought, but I truly
believe it can be done at an upstream level with little to no cost. I
believe it costs more to sit around complaining and doing nothing than
it does when you start losing customers because someone compromised them
and wiped out their accounts driving them to bankruptcy.


J. Oquendo

"It takes 20 years to build a reputation and five minutes to
ruin it. If you think about that, you'll do things
differently." - Warren Buffett

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