I don't need no stinking firewall!
Dobbins, Roland
rdobbins at arbor.net
Wed Jan 6 08:12:46 UTC 2010
On Jan 6, 2010, at 2:47 PM, James Hess wrote:
> "Overflowing the state table" then becomes only a possible
> outcome that has some acceptable level of probability, assuming
> that your other protections have already failed...
Wrong. The attacker just programmatically generates semantically-valid traffic which is indistinguishablle from real traffic, and crowds out the real traffic.
All those fancy timers and counters and what-not don't matter.
I've seen it done over and over again. Why some folks seem to think this is theoretical or that I somehow haven't thought of something they think will prove to be a magic solution is really beyond me, heh.
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Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>
Injustice is relatively easy to bear; what stings is justice.
-- H.L. Mencken
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