I don't need no stinking firewall!

Dobbins, Roland rdobbins at arbor.net
Wed Jan 6 08:12:46 UTC 2010

On Jan 6, 2010, at 2:47 PM, James Hess wrote:

> "Overflowing the state table"   then  becomes only  a  possible
> outcome  that has some acceptable  level of probability,   assuming
> that your  other protections have already failed...

Wrong.  The attacker just programmatically generates semantically-valid traffic which is indistinguishablle from real traffic, and crowds out the real traffic.

All those fancy timers and counters and what-not don't matter.

I've seen it done over and over again.  Why some folks seem to think this is theoretical or that I somehow haven't thought of something they think will prove to be a magic solution is really beyond me, heh.

Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>

    Injustice is relatively easy to bear; what stings is justice.

                        -- H.L. Mencken

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