I don't need no stinking firewall!
rdobbins at arbor.net
Wed Jan 6 05:41:40 UTC 2010
On Jan 6, 2010, at 11:52 AM, Jonathan Lassoff wrote:
> However, the "well managed" part seems to be a sticking point for most organizations I've seen. No doubt, shops that use this effectively have some sort of homebrew or commercial firewall management platform that let's you place policy in one place and make sure that it's pushed out
Concur 100% - all the commercial systems which have purported to do this to date have been unusable, miserable failures. Folks tend to use homegrown systems, starting with something as basic as RCS.
Tom Ptacek over at Matasano is working on a firewall/ACL rules management system which, given his track record of innovation, one hopes may buck this trend.
> Why so? Because of something this does to the device doing the rate limiting (I assume an upstream router of some sort), or because it renders the attack successful?
DDoS attacks are attacks against capacity and/or state. Start reducing capacity, and you end up making it even easier for the attacker's programatically-generated attack traffic to 'crowd out' the legitimate user traffic.
> I'm not so sure I follow you here. How does a "fundamental architectural
> premise" (I assume you mean keeping track of application-layer session
> state) *preclude* it from being placed in front of a server? Sure,
> it's a poor use of raw silicon and electrical power, but why does that
> rule out in advance placing it in front of a server?
Because, by definition, all incoming packets to the server are unsolicited. Therefore, it's a waste of money, and also forms a DDoS chokepoint due to the non-infinite state-table which forms the basis for said stateful firewalling.
It will fall over and die under any kind of serious attack.
> In theory though, someone could construct a massive state-tracking machine that can still keep track of stateful traffic, Mpps and above.
See above; in front of the server, there's no state to track in the first place, heh.
Fish, meet bicycle.
Additionally, it becomes an impractical physics problem (physical dimensions, logic density, power consumption, heat dissipation, et. al.) to construct a device which could even plausibly attempt this due to the extreme capacity/resource asymmetry which favors the attacker (i.e., botnets with thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even millions of compromised hosts).
Roland Dobbins <rdobbins at arbor.net> // <http://www.arbornetworks.com>
Injustice is relatively easy to bear; what stings is justice.
-- H.L. Mencken
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