NWW: Fix to Chinese Internet traffic hijack due in January

Wed Dec 8 18:23:46 UTC 2010

On Dec 8, 2010, at 10:13 AM, Eugen Leitl wrote:
> http://www.networkworld.com/cgi-bin/mailto/x.cgi?pagetosend=/news/2010/120710-chinese-internet-traffic-fix.html&pagename=/news/2010/120710-chinese-internet-traffic-fix.html&pageurl=http://www.networkworld.com/news/2010/120710-chinese-internet-traffic-fix.html&site=printpage&nsdr=n
> Fix to Chinese Internet traffic hijack due in January

FWIW, I was fairly unhappy with how PCH was portrayed in the article...  That was the product of a very long interview, and we certainly didn't suggest that the Prefix Sanity Checker was an _alternative_ to RPKI.  I very much think routing security is a critical issue, the Prefix Sanity Checker was a baby-step in that direction, which will help some people some of the time; tools that perform a cryptographic verification of RADb-style origin and transitive-path assertions are the obvious next step, and I'd very much like to see them developed.  It does seem to me, and a lot of people who've talked with me about it, however, that using existing cryptographic methods on top of existing routing-policy methods, would get us further, faster, than trying to cook up some whole new single-purpose protocol from scratch.  That was the essence of the interview I gave, and I don't think that message made it through into the finished article very obviously.

                                -Bill

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