off-topic: historical query concerning the Internet bubble

Sat Aug 7 02:47:40 UTC 2010

They were private peering stats (aggregated) from UUNET  which
show 3.5 x for roughly two years, right before the MPLS conference
in GMU.   The stats included 15% or whatever% ATM cell tax.  ANS
was not included;-)

There was also another dimension.  In addition to the vertical growth.
The backbone also expanded horizontally (coverage/millage), in a very
rapid pace.  I guess this was the reason some said the growth rate was
double digits.

I'm not sure simplify the math can explain the complexity of the network
growth.  Of cause, this is another topic.

Min

On Fri, Aug 6, 2010 at 5:52 PM, Jessica Yu <jyy_99 at yahoo.com> wrote:

> I have a concern that your posting and your paper mix UUNet traffic with
> the
> Internet traffic.  I personally was very much involved in the ISP world
> (was
> working for Tier1 ISPs) during the period and I’d like to point out the
> following:
> UUNet’s (or any other individual network’s) traffic does NOT equal to the
> Internet traffic, even at that time!
> I was working at ANSnet and later UUnet due to a three party acquisition
> deal
> between AOL, WorldCom and CompuServe during that time period.  I did hear
> presentations about network traffic being doubling every 100 days by O’Dell
> but
> my understanding was that he was referring to UUnet’s traffic not the
> Internet
> traffic.
>
> At the time, the Tier 1 ISPs included UUNet, MCI Network, Sprint Network,
> ANSnet, etc.  Each ISP could only collect network traffic stats on its own
> backbone and there was no one entity could collect the entire Internet
> traffic.
> For this reason, the prediction by O’Dell could only be based on UUNet’s
> traffic
> stats.   I really doubt that O’Dell would say the Internet traffic doubling
> every 100 days rather than saying that of UUNet’s traffic.   I’d encourage
> you
> to do some research to find out if he was really referring to the Internet
> traffic or just UUNet traffic.  The reference listed by your paper showed
> that
> he was saying ‘network traffic’ not ‘Internet traffic.’
>
> I do not know if making such distinction would alter the conclusion of your
> paper.  But, to me, there is a difference between one to predict the growth
> of
> one particular network based on the stats collected than one to predict the
> growth of the entire Internet with no solid data.
> Thanks!--Jessica
>
>
>
>
> ________________________________
> From: Andrew Odlyzko <odlyzko at umn.edu>
> To: nanog at nanog.org
> Sent: Thu, August 5, 2010 11:38:38 AM
> Subject: off-topic: historical query concerning the Internet bubble
>
> Apologies for intruding with this question, but I can't think
> of any group that might have more concrete information relevant
> to my current research.
>
>
>
> Enclosed below is an announcement of a paper on technology bubbles.
> It is based largely on the Internet bubble of a decade ago, and
> concentrates on the "Internet traffic doubling every 100 days" tale.
> As the paper shows, this myth was perceived in very different ways
> by different people, and this by itself helps undermine the foundations
> of much of modern economics and economic policy making.
>
> To get a better understanding of the dynamics of that bubble, to assist
> in the preparation of a book about that incident, I am soliciting
> information
> from anyone who was active in telecom during that period. I would
> particularly
> like to know what you and your colleagues estimated Internet traffic growth
> to
> be, and what your reaction was to the O'Dell/Sidgmore/WorldCom/UUNet myth.
> If
> you were involved in the industry,
> and never heard of it, that would be extremely useful to know, too.
>
> Ideally, I would like concrete information, backed up by dates, and
> possibly
> even emails, and a permission to quote this information.  However, I will
> settle for more informal comments, and promise confidentiality to anyone
> who requests it.
>
> Andrew Odlyzko
> odlyzko at umn.edu
>
>
>
>
>         http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/mania03.pdf<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko/doc/mania03.pdf>
>
>
>           Bubbles, gullibility, and other challenges for economics,
>             psychology, sociology, and information sciences
>
>                             Andrew Odlyzko
>
>                         School of Mathematics
>                     and Digital Technology Center
>                       University of Minnesota
>
>                             odlyzko at umn.edu
>                     http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko>
>
>                   Preliminary version, August 5, 2010
>
>
>                             ABSTRACT
>
>   Gullibility is the principal cause of bubbles.  Investors and the general
> public get snared by a "beautiful illusion" and throw caution to the wind.
> Attempts to identify and control bubbles are complicated by the fact that
> the
> authorities who might naturally be expected to take action have often
> (especially in recent years) been among the most gullible, and were
> cheerleaders
> for the exuberant behavior.  Hence what is needed is an objective measure
> of
> gullibility.
>
>   This paper argues that it should be possible to develop such a measure.
> Examples demonstrate, contrary to the efficient market dogma, that in some
> manias, even top-level business and technology leaders do fall prey to
> collective hallucinations and become irrational in objective terms.  During
> the
> Internet bubble, for example, large classes of them first became unable to
> comprehend compound interest, and then lost even the ability to do simple
> arithmetic, to the point of not being able to distinguish 2 from 10.  This
> phenomenon, together with advances in analysis of social networks and
> related
> areas, points to possible ways to develop objective and quantitative tools
> for
> measuring gullibility and other aspects of human behavior implicated in
> bubbles.  It cannot be expected to infallibly detect all destructive
> bubbles,
> and may trigger false alarms, but it ought to alert observers to periods
> where
> collective investment behavior is becoming irrational.
>
>   The proposed gullibility index might help in developing realistic
> economic
> models.  It should also assist in illuminating and guiding decision making.
>
>
>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> If you would like to be on the mailing list for notifications of future
> papers on technology bubbles, please send me a note at odlyzko at umn.edu
>
>
> The previous three papers in this series are available at:
>
> 1.  Collective hallucinations and inefficient markets: The British Railway
> Mania
> of the 1840s
>
>     http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/hallucinations.pdf<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko/doc/hallucinations.pdf>
>
>
> 2.  This time is different: An example of a giant, wildly speculative, and
> successful investment mania, B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy,
> vol.
> 10, issue 1, 2010, article 60 (registration required)
>
>     http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/vol10/iss1/art60
>
>   preprint available at:
>
>         http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/mania01.pdf<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko/doc/mania01.pdf>
>
>
> 3.  The collapse of the Railway Mania, the development of capital markets,
> and
> Robert Lucas Nash, a forgotten pioneer of accounting and financial analysis
>
>     http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/mania02.pdf<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko/doc/mania02.pdf>
>
>
> -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Source materials for the Railway Mania and the Internet bubble are
> available
> at the web pages
>
>         http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/rrsources/<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko/rrsources/>
>
> and
>
>     http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/isources/<http://www.dtc.umn.edu/%7Eodlyzko/isources/>
>
>
>
>