Congress may require ISPs to block fraud sites H.R.3817

Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu Valdis.Kletnieks at vt.edu
Thu Nov 5 16:56:46 CST 2009


On Thu, 05 Nov 2009 16:40:09 CST, Bryan King said:
> Did I miss a thread on this? Has anyone looked at this yet?

> `(2) INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS- Any Internet service provider that, on 
> or through a system or network controlled or operated by the Internet 
> service provider, transmits, routes, provides connections for, or stores 
> any material containing any misrepresentation of the kind prohibited in 
> paragraph (1) shall be liable for any damages caused thereby, including 
> damages suffered by SIPC, if the Internet service provider--

"routes" sounds the most dangerous part there.  Does this mean that if
we have a BGP peering session with somebody, we need to filter it?

Fortunately, there's the conditions:

> `(A) has actual knowledge that the material contains a misrepresentation 
> of the kind prohibited in paragraph (1), or

> `(B) in the absence of actual knowledge, is aware of facts or 
> circumstances from which it is apparent that the material contains a 
> misrepresentation of the kind prohibited in paragraph (1), and

> upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, fails to act expeditiously 
> to remove, or disable access to, the material.

So the big players that just provide bandwidth to the smaller players are
mostly off the hook - AS701 has no reason to be aware that some website in
Tortuga is in violation (which raises an intresting point - what if the
site *is* offshore?)

And the immediate usptreams will fail to obtain knowledge or awareness of
their customer's actions, the same way they always have.

Move along, nothing to see.. ;)
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