Fiber cut - response in seconds?
charles at thewybles.com
Tue Jun 2 14:41:10 CDT 2009
David Barak wrote:
> Paranoia 101 teaches us that any given encryption approach will eventually fall before a brute-force onslaught of sufficient power and duration.
Of course. Hence my comment bout the likely hood of success depending on
how much computing power they have access to. How much easier does my
job get if I have access to thousands of encrypted e-mails vs 1
encrypted e-mail? Once I factor your PKI root private key, your toast.
It was my impression that the various algorithms were designed to
prevent traffic analysis attacks, or at least vastly reduce there
effectiveness, and if some magical corner case is discovered it should
be further mitigated by key rotation right? I'm an operations guy, not a
math wizard. :)
I'm not trying to argue that the attacker in this case could
necessarily detect a flaw in the algorithm; rather, they'll get an
effectively infinite number of chances to bang against it with no
consequences. Once it's cracked, the attacker will *still* have the
physical access which is thus compromised, and then has free access to
all of the transmissions.
Sure. However couldn't they do this in a lab environment? Various
botnets give them access to massive amounts of computing power on an
ongoing basis. I presume that the folks with sufficient expertise and
knowledge to do these attacks use exploits / back doors that ensure
continued access to this computing power, which won't be
detected/patched by the little tykes doing spamming/phising/data
Then there is the ability to buy a whole lot of specialized number
crunching compute gear as well.
Granted the US govt has there own (classified) encryption algorithms and
as such that can't be replicated in a lab environment and requires
access to the physical medium carrying traffic encrypted by said
> Physical security is a prerequisite to all of the other approaches to communication security. Those cases where physical security is presumed to be non-existant have to rely on a lot of out-of-band knowledge for any given method to be resistant to attack, and it's very hard to make use of a connection of that type for regular operations.
Really? The US Military uses a whole lot of wireless (satellite, ground
baed, surface to air) links. Those links can be sniffed (by people with
sufficient motivation/funding/gear to do so). They rely on encryption to
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