Tightened DNS security question re: DNS amplification attacks.

Thu Jan 29 01:58:08 UTC 2009

	The bad guys want amplification but will take obscuring
	if that's all they can get.

	RD=1 is only the signature of the current attack.

	RD=0 is equally viable.

	Can you cope with "RD=0 NS ." directed to the root servers
	from forged addresses?  This is exactly the query name
	servers use to prime their caches with.

	Stop trying to figure out how to stop the attack of the day
	as it really is a waste of time and start trying to figure
	out how to get near universal BCP 38 deployment.

	Let the world know you are a good you if are deploying BCP
	38.

	Put up on your front web page what percentage of address
	space / links are convered by BCP 38 compliance, where
	compliance is defined as "traffic sourced from a arbitary
	address will not be passed".  This should be auditable.

	Mark
-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742                 INTERNET: Mark_Andrews at isc.org