prefix hijack by ASN 8997
cchurc05 at harris.com
Tue Sep 23 08:00:44 CDT 2008
Agree on #2 as well. You can bet they're also reading Nanog right now
to see who and how it was detected. Oh, well, on with the fight.
From: Christian Koch [mailto:christian at broknrobot.com]
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2008 12:58 AM
To: Justin Shore; surfer at mauigateway.com; nanog at merit.edu
Subject: Re: prefix hijack by ASN 8997
At first glance this morning not seeing any data between the gain and
lost alerts from phas and inability to find a route in any of the many
collectors and route servers out there I had thought it was a possibly
a fat finger mistake by 8997 or a false positive.
After locating the data in bgplay/rviews, and noticing how many more
people this occured to I'm leaning towards 2 possible scenarios:
1 - bgp misconfigurations leading to leaks
(Depends on the overall scale of how many other prefixes were
2 - 8997 began announcing prefixes as an experiment to "test the
waters" for potential real hijacks in future...
'geography' hints towards #2
Or both theories could be way off :)
I'd be interested to know if Renesys collected any data that might
give some better insight to this...
On 9/23/08, Justin Shore <justin at justinshore.com> wrote:
> Looking up some of my prefixes in PHAS and BGPPlay, I too see my
> prefixes being advertised by 8997 for a short time. It looks like it
> happened around 1222091563 according to PHAS.
> Was this a mistake or something else?
> Christian Koch wrote:
>> I received a phas notification about this today as well...
>> I couldn't find any relevant data confirming the announcement of one
>> of my /19 blocks, until a few minutes ago when i checked the route
>> views bgplay (ripe bgplay turns up nothing) and can now see 8997
>> announcing and quickly withdrawing my prefix
>> On Mon, Sep 22, 2008 at 9:06 PM, Scott Weeks <surfer at mauigateway.com>
>>> I am hoping to confirm a short-duration prefix hijack of
>>> (and another of our prefixes) by ASN 8997 ("OJSC North-West Telecom"
>>> Russia) in using ASN 3267 (Russian Federal University Network) to
>>> advertise our space to ASN 3277 (Regional University and Scientific
>>> Network (RUSNet) of North-Western and Saint-Petersburg Area of
>>> Is that what I'm seeing when I go to "bgplay.routeviews.org/bgplay",
>>> in prefix 220.127.116.11/15 and select the dates:
>>> 22/9/2008 9:00:00 and 22/9/2008 15:00:00
>>> If so, am I understanding it correctly if I say ASN 3267 saw a
>>> path from ASN 8997, so refused the proper announcement from ASN
>>> (me) it normally hears from ASN 174 (Cogent).
>>> If the above two are correct, would it be correct to say only the
>>> downstream customers of ASN 3267 were affected?
Sent from my mobile device
More information about the NANOG