hat tip to .gov hostmasters
mike at mtcc.com
Mon Sep 22 10:42:58 CDT 2008
Jason Frisvold wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 22, 2008 at 11:02 AM, Chris Owen <owenc at hubris.net> wrote:
>> Chicken, meet egg.
>> I think the point of the original post is that one end or the other has to
>> start things. At least we have one US zone doing something on the server
>> end of things.
> Oh, agreed, absolutely. And it's great to see. However, neither the
> slashdot blurb, nor the NetworkWorld article mention that without a
> valid resolver, there is no guarantee of security. Sure, they mention
> that vendors are rolling it out and that ISPs should be following
> suit, but no mention is made of the end-user's resolver at all...
I dunno, a few very strategically placed validating resolvers could subject
a huge amount of DNS traffic to a much higher bar were the senders so
inclined to sign their zones. But I tend to view these kinds of things much
more from an "epidemiology" point of view: you don't have to have 100%
eradication to control an epidemic. Same thing pretty much goes with
based attacks, IMO: when the barrier is set sufficiently high in one area,
attackers don't spend their entire time trying to break that barrier,
they find the
next lowest barrier and move on.
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