an effect of ignoring BCP38

k claffy kc at caida.org
Sat Sep 6 13:49:05 UTC 2008


do that many networks really allow spoofing?  i used
to think so, based on hearsay, but rob beverly's
http://spoofer.csail.mit.edu/summary.php suggests
things are a lot better than they used to be, arbor's
last survey echos same.  are rob's numbers inconsistent
with numbers anyone else believes to be true?

i think you unfairly characterize UW's work,
but i also think you make questionable inferences 
regarding the extent of spoofing, which seems more 
relevant to nanog.

k


On Fri, Sep 05, 2008 at 05:22:27AM +0000, bmanning at vacation.karoshi.com wrote:
  
   
  seems that some folks in the R&E community, with institutional support
  from Cisco, Google, and the US NSF, are exploiting our inability to
  take even rudimentary steps toward providing a level of integrity in
  routing by teaching students that spoofing IP space is ok.  This whole
  thing works at all because so few people use/deploy/maintain BCP-38
  compliance.  This was an eye-opener for me.
   
  http://www.caida.org/workshops/wide/0808/slides/measuring_reverse_paths.pdf
   
  
  --bill
  




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