YouTube IP Hijacking

Mon Feb 25 04:24:44 UTC 2008


On Feb 24, 2008, at 2:14 PM, Tomas L. Byrnes wrote:

>
> I figured as much, but it was worth a try.
>
> Which touches on the earlier discussion of the null routing of /32s
> advertised by a special AS (as a means of black-holing DDOS traffic).
>
> It seems to me that a more immediately germane matter regarding BGP
> route propagation is prevention of hijacking of critical routes.
>
> Perhaps certain ASes that are considered "high priority", like Google,
> YouTube, Yahoo, MS (at least their update servers), can be trusted to
> propagate routes that are not aggregated/filtered, so as to give them
> control over their reachability and immunity to longer-prefix  
> hijacking
> (especially problematic with things like MS update sites).
>
>
That's just inviting the injection of forged AS routes to commit
abuse.

Owen

>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Simon Lockhart [mailto:simon at slimey.org]
>> Sent: Sunday, February 24, 2008 2:07 PM
>> To: Tomas L. Byrnes
>> Cc: Michael Smith; neil.fenemor at fx.net.nz; will at harg.net;
>> nanog at merit.edu
>> Subject: Re: YouTube IP Hijacking
>>
>> On Sun Feb 24, 2008 at 01:49:00PM -0800, Tomas L. Byrnes wrote:
>>> Which means that, by advertising routes more specific than the ones
>>> they are poisoning, it may well be possible to restore universal
>>> connectivity to YouTube.
>>
>> Well, if you can get them in there.... Youtube tried that, to
>> restore service to the rest of the world, and the
>> announcements didn't propogate.
>>
>> Simon
>>