PKI operators anyone?
jcurran at mail.com
Wed Sep 5 14:27:32 UTC 2007
At 10:06 AM -0400 9/5/07, Joe Maimon wrote:
>80 years for the root, 4096bit key
>35 years for the policy, 4096bit key
>15 years for the issuing, ?bit key
><=5 years for the issued certificates.
>Good idea? Bad Idea? Comments?
What's the implications of a single issued certificate being
cracked, and again for one of the root/policy/issuing set?
There's quite a bit of speedy hardware out there today
(particularly if you count things like repurposed video
processors) and 5 years is a *very* long time in our
industry. You can actually hunt down the CPS for
most public CA's, and I think you'll find that they put
up with the "loads of fun every 11 months or so..."
However, for them the implications of a compromised
issued cert is potential customer liability, and for an
the issuing certificate or above is basically loss of their
confidence in their entire business of being a CA. You
have to assess the implications based on the expected
certificate use for your CA.
Hope this helps,
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